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2Michael C. Keeley*
Cyclical variation in the rates at which persons enter and leave the
laborforce strongly affect the unemployment rate. Analysis ofmonthly
data on employment-status transition probabilities shows that, during
recessions, the probability an unemployed person will drop out ofthe
laborforce decreases andthe probabilitya person not in the laborforce
will enter the labor force to search for employment increases. The
cyclicalbehaviorofthese two transition probabilities thus castsdoubt on
the widely accepted discouraged-worker hypothesis. which predictsjust
the opposite cyclicalpattern. On net. the variation in the rates oflabor
force entry andexit overthe business cycle cause the unemploymentrate
to be much higher during recessions andmuch lower during expansions
than ifthe rates were constant. Therefore. the cyclical variation in the
unemployment rate does not correspond to the cyclical variation in the
demandfor labor.
The effects of the cyclical variation in the labor
force participation rate on unemployment in terms
of "added-worker" and "discouraged-worker"
effects have been controversial topics since the
Great Depression, in part, because of their macro-
economic policy implications. Forexample, ifmany
persons seeking work become discouraged and leave
the laborforce during recessions (which many recent
studies imply), then measured unemploymentduring
recessions would be lower(because ofthe decline in
the number of people classified as unemployed)
than ifdecisions to give up searching for a job did
not vary over the business cycle. On the otherhand,
ifduring recessions many persons entered the labor
force to seekjobs(addedworkers), perhaps because
of.unemployment by a family member, measured
unemployment during recessions would be higher.
*Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco. Jennifer Eccles provided valuable research
assistance. Comments from Jack Beebe, Fred
Furlong, Rose McElhattan, Randall Pozdena, and
John Scadding are much appreciated.
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In 1966, in a classic article dealing with these
issues, Jacob Mincer (1966, p. 73) wrote that"After
three decades ofresearch and occasionally animated
controversy, the short-run behavior of the labor
force is still not well understood." Although there
has been a considerable body of research since
then I, a comprehensive understanding ofthe cyclical
behavior of the labor market and the relationship
between labor force participation and unemploy-
ment still eludes us. This paper contributes to this
literature by analyzing the effects of the cyclical
variationinlaborforce entry andexitrates, which in
tum determine the labor force participation rate, on
unemploymentand employment.
The cyclical variation in labor force entry and
exitrates reported in this papercastdoubton several
widely acceptedhypotheses regarding the short-run
behaviorofthe labormarket. One key finding is that
variations in these rates over the business cycle
cause measured unemployment to.be much higher
during recessions than it otherwise would be. This
contrasts with the generally accepted hypothesis
that cyclical variations in labor force entry and exit
cause unemployment to be lower because of thediscouraged-workereffect.
Many previous studies have attempted to test the
added-worker and discouraged-worker hypotheses
indirectly by analyzing the effects of the cyclical
variation in the labor force participation rate on
unemployment. This paper, however, uses disag-
gregated data on monthly transitions among the
states of unemployment, employment and not-in-
the-labor-force to test these hypotheses directly. For
example, laborforce entry and exit probabilities are
disaggregated into their four basic components:
entry into (1) unemployment and (2) employment,
and exit from (3) employment and (4) unemploy-
ment. Transition probabilities (the monthly proba-
bility of moving from one labor force status to
another) are estimated using gross-flow data from
matched monthly Current Population Surveys from
January 1968 through March 1984.
The results indicate that disaggregation reveals
many aspects of labor market behavior that are
masked in aggregate data. For example, increased
labor force exit from a state of employment in-
creases the unemployment rate because the number
unemployed (the numerator) is unaffected while the
labor force (the denominator) decreases. Similarly,
increased exit from a state of unemployment de-
creases the unemployment rate. Both sorts ofexit,
however, reduce the laborforce participation rate.
The stock-flow model ofthe labormarket presen-
ted in this paper is useful for analyzing labor-
market-business-cycle dynamics because it focuses
on the variation in flows among different employ-
ment status categories: disaggregated labor force
entry and exit rates and transition rates· between
employment and unemployment. Variations in
aggregate unemployment and employment (stocks)
are determined by these transition rates (the flow in
minus the flow out) so that ifthe dynamics ofthese
transition rates are understood, the dynamics of
unemployment and employment are too.
An analysis ofthe cyclical variation in transition
rates provides an explanation for the much larger
cyclical variation in unemployment rates than in
employment rates. 2 For example, although unem-
ployment rates during the last recession were the
highest since the Depression, employment rates
were only slightly lower than their historical high.
This apparent divergence in two indicators oftight-
ness in the labor market can be explained by the
cyclical behavior oflabor force entry and exit rates
and their differential effects on unemployment and
employment.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section I, a
brief review of the theory and evidence regarding
the cyclical behavior of employment, unemploy-
ment and labor force participation and their inter-
relationships is presented. Section II presents a
description of the stock-flow model of the labor
market and thedata used to estimate its parameters.
Section III presents the estimates of the monthly
labor market transition probabilities for the 1968-
1984 period, discusses the cyclical determinants of
variations in these probabilities, and shows how the
variation in these probabilities explain the cyclical
variation in unemployment and employment rates.
Finally, Section IV summarizes the research and
presents the conclusions.
are. On one level, these"hypotheses" can be taken
as simple descriptions ofhow labor force entry and
exit vary over the business cycle. "Additional"
workers are hypothesized to enter the labor force
during recessions and "discouraged" workers to
leave. As simple descriptions of aggregate labor
force behavior, these hypotheses can be taken as
separate and opposing "theories." However, at a
more fundamental level, these hypotheses can be
assumed to refer to basic economic forces affecting
decision-making about labor force activity. In fact,
Mincer (1966) interpreted the discouraged- and
I. A Review ofthe Theory and Evidence
Although there is no widely accepted theory ex-
plaining business-cycle variations in the demand for
labor or the cyclical variation in unemployment,
cyclical variations in the supply oflaboroften have
been described in terms of the added-worker and
discouraged-worker hypotheses. Below these
hypotheses and their policy implications are re-
viewed along with evidence regarding the relation-
ship between cyclical variations in laborforce parti-
cipation and unemployment.
In the literature, it is unclear exactly what the
discouraged-worker and added-worker hypotheses
6added-worker effects as substitution and income
effects respectively. Thus, both forces would co-
exist. For some workers, the forces ofdiscourage-
ment would dominate, while for others, induce-
ments to work woulddominate.
This interpretation of the discouraged-worker
hypothesis-that labor force participants are more
likely to withdraw and potential entrants are less
likely to enter the labor force during recessions
because of lower current wages relative to normal
wages-can be thought ofas an intertemporal sub-
stitutioneffect in a life-cycle model. That is, given
that there is temporal variation in wage rates over
the life cycle due to the business cycle, it is optimal
to work the most when wage rates are high. This
would result in a procyclical variation in the quan-
tity of labor supplied3. Such cyclical variations in
labor force participation in response to cyclical
variations in actual wage rates would represent
movements along an aggregate labor-supply curve.
As such, they do not imply that there are a group of
workers who should be counted as unemployed
during recessions because movements along the
labor-supply curve could occur even if unemploy-
ment were always zero. They only imply that the
aggregate labor force participation function is posi-
tively sloped. Perhaps because this interpretation of
the discouraged-worker effect pertains to the slope
of the labor-supply function, and not on how it
shifts over the business cycle, it is not widely
accepted.
The most common modem interpretation of the
discouraged-worker hypothesis is thatthe increased
costs of searching for employment during a reces-
sion relative to the implicit value of time in non-
market activities cause "discouragement" (See
Gr?nau, 1971, Ehrenberg and Smith, 1982,. and
McElhattan, 1977, 1980). Search costs, it is argued,
increase during a recession because a lower job
vacancyra.te resultsin a reducedstreamofjoboffers
and. possibly because the personal rate of discount
increases. A relative increase insearch costs would
lower a searcher's minimum acceptance wage
compared to the value oftime in non-market activi-
ties. This,·· ill·turn,<WollId .increa.se· the.likelihood
thatan unernployedworker would abandon his or
her job search and withdraw from the labor force,
and it would decrease the likelihood that a person
not in the labor force would enterthe labor force to
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search for employment. Increases in search costs
would also lower the likelihood that an employed
personwouldquithis orherjobto searchfor a better
one.
This search-cost interpretation of the discour-
aged-workereffect implies thatthe aggregate labor-
supply function shifts leftward when discourage-
ment increases. For example, suppose a group of
workers eams exactly the minimum wage and that
declining labor demand during a recession brings
the market-clearing wage below the minimum.
Somefraction ofthose employed will lose theirjobs
and some of them may drop out ofthe labor force
because of an increase in search costs caused by a
decline in the probability of obtaining a minimum
wage job. This causes a leftward shift in the labor-
supply function, which leads to lower measured
unemployment than if all those who lost their jobs
remained in the labor force.
In an attempt, perhaps, to measure the size ofthe
group of persons who are not in the labor force
because ofhigh search costs, the Census Bureau, in
1967, added some questions to the monthly Current
Population Survey. The Bureau defines discouraged
workers as those persons who are not working and
not looking for work but who indicate they want a
job and believe they cannot get one. Such a defini-
tion is, however, difficult to interpret since no
questions are asked regarding the type ofjob and
wage the person expects. In one sense, all non-
workers would be discouraged workers by this
Censusdefinitionsince all non-workers would want
a job at some wage. Furthermore, non-working
persons whoare not looking for work are not looking
because the value of their time in non-market pur-
suits exceeds the expected wage they can obtain.
Presumably,then, all non-working persons believe
noacceptable workcanbe found, orat least that it is
notworthwhile to spend resourcesactivelysearch-
ing. Thus, it is unclear how persons are interpreting
and answering these questions aimed at identifying
discouraged workers. Given the· ambiguityofthe
questions, it is not surprising that this Census
measure is not useful. For example, anempirical
studybyMcElhattan (1980)indicatesthat thesurvey
response is unsuccessful in distinguishing discour-
aged workers from other non-participants in terms
ofactual labormarket behavior.
Although the Census definition of discouragedworkers is not meaningful, there, in fact, may be
workers who report themselves as not in the labor
force who would be in the labor force ifit were not
for various restrictions such as the minimum wage.
Such persons may want and be willing to accept a
below-minimum-wage job, but do not make the
effort to find employment. Thus, artificial labor
market barriers might cause workers to become
,'discouraged," drop out ofthe labor force and not
be counted as unemployed even though they would
be labor market participants if the barriers were
removed. Such a shift in the aggregate labor-supply
function would imply that the unemployment rate
does not move in tandem with aggregate demand
and that increases in unemployment during reces-
sions, in a sense, would underestimate the decline
in demand.
The added-worker effect, first extensively anal-
yzed by Woytinsky (1940), is that the rate ofentry
into the labor force during recessions is higher be-
cause additional persons try to find work. The
added-worker effect is often described in terms of
an income effect- falling family income during a
recession, due to lower wages orunemployment of
the primary earner, decreases the impliCit value of
time (in non-market pursuits) ofother nonworking
family members relative to market wages and thus
makes their entry into the labor force more likely.
The income-effect interpretation of the added-
worker hypothesis implies a rightward shift in the
aggregatelabor-supply function. Such a shiftwould
increase measured unemployment and wouldimply
that the unemploymentrate overstates the effects of
a recession on the labormarket.
The interpretation of the added-worker effect as
an income effect is, however, inconsistent with the
life-cycle model. 4 This is because in a life cycle
context, consumption, including the consumption
of leisure (and hence labor supply), dependson
permanent income (wealth). Minor trarisitory
changes in income, due to a recession, which have
only minoreffects on wealth, are thereforepredic-
ted to have only minor effects on labor supply. In
fact, to the extent they can be antiCipated,such
transitoryincomechangeshavenoeffectsonwealth
and thus would have no effects on labor supply.
Furthermore, the income-effectinterpretationofthe
added-worker hypothesis requires that the impliCit
value of time of non-workers decline relative to
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expectedmarketwages, which presumably also are
declining during a recession.
Another, perhaps more plausible theoretical in-
terpretation of the added-worker effect applies the
household-production model (see Becker, 1965).
This model assumes that unemploymenthas a large
stochastic component (that is, it is difficult to predict
accurately) and that the time onespousecontributes
to household production is a substitute for the time
of the other spouse. These assumptions imply that
the unemployment ofone spouse, which increases
that spouse's input of time into household prodUC-
tion, would lower the (shadow) value ofthe other
spouse's time. 5 Thus, it is more likely that the other
spouse will seekemployment, and for a period, both
spouses would berecordedas unemployed.Ifinfact
this sort of effect were important empirically, it
would mean that the increase in the measured un-
employment rate would overstate the deterioration
in labor market conditions because the loss of one
job would result in two persons being recorded as
unemployed.
Early empirical work by Long (1958) indicated
that neither the added-worker nor discouraged-
worker effect appeared to dominate and that labor
force participation did not vary with the business
cycle.
A study by Hansen (1961), covering the 1948-
1959 period was one of the first to use gross-flow
data. It found that entry into unemployment rose
during recessions, but unlike the results in this
paper, thatlaborforce exitfrom unemploymentalso
increased, approximately offsetting the increased
entry. Thus, his results suggest that the number of
unemployed is not affected by cyclical changes in
entry and exit. However, Hansen did not analyze
labor force entry and exit from employment. Since
labor force entry into employment is likely to be
procyclical, Hansen's results suggest net procydi-
cal variation in the labor force participationrate.
More recent studies, such as those by Demberg
andStrand(1966), Barth (1968), Tella(1964), Kuch
and Sharir (1978) find evidence, based on time-
series macro data, supporting procyc1ical1abor-
force participation. These studies typically regress
labor force participation rates on employment rates
and various other variables and find a positive rela-
tionship between the employment rate6 and the
labor-force participation rate.Time-series models like these have been used to
estimate the numberofdiscouraged workers, which
is also referred to as "hidden" or "disguised"
unemployment or the labor force "reserve".8
Hypothetical "full employment" levels are set for
the independent variables (that is, the employment
rate) to predict the full-employment level of the
labor force, and employment is assumed to be fixed
at its actual level. The difference between the actual
labor force and the hypothetical full-employment
labor force is used as a measure of hidden unem-
ploymentor discourag~dworkers.
These studies assume that all the cyclical varia-
tions in the labor force participation function repre-
sent shifts in the aggregate labor force participation
function, not movements along it. However, the
hypothetical increase in the number of labor force
participants would not necessarily result in a one-
for-one increase in the number of the unemployed
because employment is not determined solely by
Jemand-itdepends on supply factors also.There-
fore, cyclical changes in the labor force participa-
tion rate do not necessarily represent shifts in the
aggregate labor-supply curve instead ofmovements
along it.
To the extent business cycles represent variations
in the demand for labor, aggregate labor force parti-
cipation should be procydical. The labor force
participation rate should be a positive function of
the own wage ceterisparibus and hence procyclical
because, as noted by Ben Porath (1973), even
though wage increases have offsetting income
(negative) and substitution (positive) effects on labor
supply, they do not have any (own) incomeeffecton
labor force participation. That is, an increase in
one's wage rate cannot make one more likely to
leave the labor force or less likely to enter. This is
especially true in terms of the life-cycle model, in
which cyclical wage changes have no income
effects. Ifthe procyclical variation in the laborforce
participation rate simply reflects a positively sloping
aggregate labor force participation function, then
this has no implications for the normative concept
ofdiscouraged workers orthe existence ofa poolof
"hidden" unemployedpersons because the slope of
the labor force participation function does not
depend on unemployment.
Thus, procyclical labor force participation alone
does not imply net discouragement or the existence
of discouraged workers. Although net discourage-
ment due to higher search costs, for example, may
lead to procyclicallabor force participation, labor
force participation may vary procyclically for a
variety of other reasons including a procyclical
variation in actual wages (andperhaps even cyclical
variation in implicit wages in the non-market
sector).
In fact, results presented in SectionIII contradict
the hypothesis that the cyclical variation in labor
force entry and exit rates causes measured unem-
ployment to be lowerduring recessions. These new
results indicate that the cyclical variation in labor
force exitand entry rates (whichdetermine the labor
force participation rate) cause the measured unem-
ployment rate to be higher during recessions than it
would be if these rates were constant. In addition,
the results show that the high-search-cost interpre-
tation of discouragement is inconsistent with the
observed pattern oflabor force exit from and entry
into unemployment.
II. A Stock-Flow Model ofthe Labor Market
In this section, a three-state-employment, un-
employment, and not-in-the-Iabor-force-Markov
model of the labor market is. described. Such a
model, with its six possible transitions (that is,
flows) among the three states, provides much more
inforrtlatiOn about the cyclicalbehaviorofthe labor
marketthanthe three stocksofpersons in eachstate,
which have been the focus of most work on the
cyclical behaviorofthe labor force.
One reason that flows do provide more informa-
tion is that the labor force is dynamic not static. For
9
example, in an average month, the number of
persons who become unemployed by entering the
labor force is almost as large as the number of
employed persons who lose their jobs and become
unemployed. Thus, labor force entry and exit and
whether entry is into orexit is from unemployment
or employment· can have very large·· effects· on
unemployment andemployment rates.
This dynamic nature of the labor market is one
reason that aggregate unemployment and employ-
ment statistics may give very different pictures ofFigure 1
A Stock-Flow Model of the Labor Market
(in Millions of Persons, Average Monthly Flows 1969-19a4)
status categories and can change status by leaving
his or her current state and moving to one of the
othertwo states. An unemployedperson, for exam-
pie, can either become employed or drop out ofthe
labor force. In Figure 1, average monthly flows
among three employment status categories and av-
erage monthly stocks in these categoriesforJanuary
1968 through March 1984 are presented. Thesedata
showthe highly dynamic nature ofthelabormarket.
For example, in the "average" month, 3.1 million
unemployed persons (48 percent of the unem-
ployed), either found employment (1.6 million) or
dropped out of the labor force (1.5 million), while
2.6 million otherpersons became unemployed.
Stock-flow data, like those in the figure, can be
used to calculate the monthly transition probabilities
ofany of the six possible transitions. The monthly
transition probability, for example, betweenunem-
ployment and employment is defined as the number
of initially unemployed persons (in month t) who
subsequently (in month t+ 1) find employment, di-
vided by the total number of initially unemployed
persons.
If we denote the states of employment, unem-
ployment, and not-in-the-Iabor-force as E, U, and
N, respectively, the monthly Current Population
Survey can be used to compute theMarkovrnatrix
oftransition probabilities, Ptfor montht, where:
the cyclical variation in the labor market. In con-
trast, ifthe laborforce were static andconsistedofa
given group ofthe population that either worked or
were unemployed, then the unemployment rate
would have a straightforward interpretation.. High
unemployment would mean a smallerprobabilityof
beingemployed for a memberofthegroup. Further-
more, ifthe labor force group were a constant frac-
tion ofthe population, employment and unemploy-
ment rates would be mirror images of the same
phenomenon-high unemployment would imply a
low likelihood of employment and vice versa.
Aggregate statistics on the stocks ofthe population
in various labor force statuses mask large counter-
balancing flows. It is possible, however, to analyze
these flows and their relation to the stocks.
During the last ten years, the applicationofstock-
flow analysis to the labor market has increased the
ability to analyze, measure and interpret changes in
aggregate unemployment and employment. 9 Itcan
be shown that employmentand unemploymentrates
are the outcomes of a process related to the deci-
sions ofemployers and individuals, both inand out
of the labor force, regarding labor market transi-
tions between employment, unemployment and
not-in-the-Iabor-force.
Monthly flows among these three states are avail-
able from unpublished data from matched Current
Population Surveys. 10 Some researchers have been
concerned that reported flows may be biased be-
cause of possible selective attribution from the
matched sample and selective entry in the special
matched sample required to estimate the flows. II
Such a bias would be especially important for the
analysis in this paper ifselective attritionand entry
varied with the business cycle. However, we have
employed a statistical method ofadjusting the flow
data to make itmore consistentwiththefulFsample
data and to control partially for pqssible selective
attribution and entry bias over the business cycle.
(This method, originally suggested by Smith. and
Vanski, 1978, is described in Keeley, 1984). The
results in this paper are not sensitive to this adjust-
ment process. The flows were.·also seasonally ad-
justed using the Census Departrnent's"Xll"sea-
sonal adjustment program.
A depiction of a stock-flow model of the. labor
market is presented in Figure 1. At any given time,








and where ij, is the monthly probabilityoftransition
from state i to state j in month t. Although this
matrix has nine elements, there are only six inde-
pendent numbers since ee, for example, equals
l-eu-en. Given an initial distribution ofthe popula-
tion in month t (E" U" N,), (where E" for example,
is the fraction of the population employed), the
distribution in the next month t+ 1is given by:
(E"Ut, N,) Pt = (E,+" U,+" N,+,) (2)
Applying equation (2) recursively, the distribution
ofthe population at any moment, T, is given by:
(Eo, Uo, No) PoP,...PT -, = (ET, UT, NT) (3)
Thus, the employment-status distribution of the
population at any moment in time is completely
determined by the initial distribution ofthe popula-
tion and the matricies ofmonthly transition proba-
bilities. Thus, any changes in the distribution are
entirely determined by the monthly transition prob-
abilities and changes in monthly probabilities.
Sinceeach element ofthe P, matrix is greaterthan
zero, it canbe shown that asteady-state distribution
of the population among the three employment
states exists that is independent ofthe initial distri-
bution.Thesteady-state distribution has the proper-
ty that
(Es, U" Ns)P = (E" U" Ns) (4)
where (Es, Us, Ns) is the steady-state distribution
associated with a particular transition matrix P.
Thus, givena transition matrix P that does not vary
over time, the steady-state distribution (Es, U" N.)
will result eventually.
The steady-state distribution is of interest, not
because the labor market is necessarily ever in
steady-state equilibrium, but.because the steady
state indicates where the labor market is headed if
th~currenttransitionprobabilities.were to remain
constant.• Large differences between the current
distributiou<lnd the.steady state are. expected to
occurwhen the labormarkettransitionprobabilities
change rapidly, as during the beginning ofa recov-
ery, for example. In fact, the steady-state unem-
ployment rate generally does exceed the actual rate
during recessions, when rates are rising, and does





As equation (3) indicates, cyclical variations in
employment or unemployment can be explained in
terms of cyclical variations in transition rates.
Below, the mathematics ofthe effects ofchanges in
transition rates on unemployment and employment
are explored.




where Uis the fraction ofthe population unemployed
and E is the fraction ofthe population employed.
To analyze how the unemployment rate varies
when a transition probability changes in the short-
run (one period), equation (2) is substituted into the
total differential of 5:
(U+E)(Edeu-Udue)
du = (U+E)2
+ EU (den-dun) + ENdnu-UNdne
(U + E)2 (6)
The first term in brackets shows how changes in
flows within the labor force (eu and ue) affect
unemployment, while the second term in brackets
shows how changes in labor force entry and· exit
probabilities (en, un, nu and ne) influence unem-
ployment. Equation (6) shows that a change in any
one ofthe six transition probabilities can affect the
unemployment rate directly.
Changes in Flows within the laborForce
Changes in either of the two rates (eu or ue) of
transition within the labor force, while labor force
entry and exit rates (en, un, nu and ne) are held
constant, do not affect the size ofthe laborforce or
the labor force participation rate directly (since N
does not depend on eu or ue). Changes in these two
rates do affect the unemployment rate in a straight-
forward manner consistent with the common inter-
pretation given tothe unemploymentrate.
Increases in the probability ofbecomingemploy-
ed if unemployed (ue), or reductions in the proba-
bility of becoming unemployed if employed (eu),
both result in short-run decreases in the unemploy-
ment rate. Effects on the employment rate arebasically effects on E (dE = - Edeu + Udue) since
the denominator of the employment rate (the
population) is not affected by changes in either of
these rates. Thus, increases in ue ordecreases in eu
increase the employment rate (since dE = -dU).
The effects on the steady-state unemployment mid
employment rates have the same sign as these one-
periodeffects. 12
Changes in Labor Force Entry
and Exit Rates
The effects of changes in the four labor force
entry and exit probabilities, holding constant the
within-labor-force transition probabilities, are given
by the second term in brackets in equation (6).
Changes in labor force entry and exit rates can
affect the fraction of unemployed and employed
persons (stocks) in the population as well as the
labor force participation rate. Increased flows from
those not in the laborforce intounemployment(nu),
otherthings equal, increase the unemploymentrate,
while increased flows into employment (ne) reduce
it. Also, reduced labor-force exits from unemploy-
ment (un) increase the unemployment rate while
reduced labor-force exits from employment (en)
reduce it. However, in a given month, the employ-
ment rate is positively affected only by increased
labor force entry into employment (ne) or reduced
labor force exit from employment (en), and isnot
affected by entry into or exit from unemployment
(nu or un). This means that the unemployment rate
would vary more over the business cycle than the
employmentrate ifnu andun varyoverthe business
cycle in such a way that their effects on the unem-
ployment rate do not offset eachother. The steady-
state effects ofchanges in these rates on unemploy-
ment also can be shown to have the same signsas
the short-run effects. 13
The labor force participationrate is also affected
by changes in all four labor force entry and .exit
probabilities. The labor-force participationrate.is
given by:
Totally differentiating equation (7) and substitut-
ing the entry and exit transition equations gives:
dL = -den (E~ + 2EoNo) + dne (2Ng + 2EoNo)
(E + U + N)2
-dun(2NoUo+ EoUo) + dnu(2NJ + EoNo)
(E + U + N)2 (8)
Equation (8) shows that increased labor-force
entry intoeitheremployment(ne) orunemployment
(nu) increases the labor force participation rate.
However, equation (6) shows that increased labor
force entry intoemployment(ne) reduces the unem-
ployment rate while increased entry into unem-
ployment (nu) increases the unemployment rate.
Similarly, increased labor force exit.from either
employment (en) orunemployment (un) reduce the
labor force participation rate while the former (en)
increases the unemployment rate and the latter (un)
reduces it. Thus, there is no simple correspondence
between changes in labor force participation and
unemployment.
As discussed in Section I, many authors. have
argued that labor force participation falls during
recessions and that, as a result, unemployment is
lower than it otherwise would be. The preceding
analysis suggests that this argument is too simplistic.
Whether unemployment is lower when the labor
force participation rate is lower depends on the
source ofthe decline in labor force participation. If
labor force participation declines because of in-
creased flows outofunemployment (un)orreduced
flows into unemployment (nu), changes consistent
with the search-cost interpretation ofthe discour-
aged-worker hypothesis, then it is tlllethat lower
labor force participation is associated with lower
measured unemployment. If, orithe other hand,
lowerlabor-force participation were dueto increased
flows outofemployment(en)orreducedflowsinto
employment (ne), measured unemploymentwould





Below, estimates ofthe six monthly laborforce
transition probabilitiesfor the January 1968 through
Match 1984 periodatepresented. First, we consider
the cyclical variation in flows within the laborforce
(eu and ue) and then look at laborforce entry and
exit. Thecyclical variationofflows within the labor
force conform to the patterns expected while flows
between unemployment and not-in-the-labor-force
are the opposite of those predicted by the widely
accepted discouraged-worker hypothesis.
Flows within the Labor Force
During a recession, declines in aggregate output
lead to increased layoffs as employers reduce the
sizes or rates of growth of their workforces. This
results in an increase in the probability that an
employed person will become unemployed (eu)
because a large proportion ofworkers who are laid-
off become unemployed l4 and only a very small
proportion leave the labor force. Very few laid-off
workers leaVe the labor force because they either
search for anotherjob orwait to be recalled to their
previous job and be7 ausemostlaid-offworkers·are
eligible for unemployment compensation, receipt
of which is conditional on remaining in the labor
force. 15
The data in Chart I on monthly transition proba-
bilities between employment and. unemployment
(eu) confirm thisnotion, showing sharpincreases in
the probabilities ofworkers becoming unemployed
during recessions and declines during expansions.
For example, the probability of becoming unem-
ployed ifemployedrose almost 25 percentfrom peak
to trough during the 1981-1982 recession, and there
was almost a 75-percent increase dUring the 1973-
1974 recession.
Chart 1
Flows Within the Labor Force (EU)










(Seasonally Adjusted 3-month Moving Averages)
13During a recession, the probability that anullem~
ployed person finds employment is expected to
decline. This is because it is less likely that a job
offer will exceed the searcher's minimum reserva-
tion wage (and be acceptable) and because.a searcher
will receive fewer joboffers.
The data in Chart2confirmthatthe probabilityof
finding employment if unemployed (ue) doesyary
strongly with the business cycle. Forexample, dur-
ing the 1981-1982 recession, this rate declined
dramatically from about .25 per month to .20 from
peak to trough. This implies that the expected dura-
tion ofunemployment for those who found employ-
ment increased from 4 to 5 months. During the
1973-1974 recession, the rate declined from about
.31 to .23-orover 50 percent.
These changes in flows within the labor force 16
(increases in the probability of becoming unem-
ployed ifemployed and reductions in the probability
ofbecoming employed ifunemployedduring reces-
sions) are consistent with the normal interpretation
given to changes in the unemployment rate. Ahigher
unemployment rate is typically taken to mean more
job losses resulting from layoffs andmore difficulty
in finding employment ifunemployed__andbothof
these factors increase the unemployment rate and
decrease the employment rate.
The unemployment rate, however, increases more
than either factor alone because the number of
unemployed is positively affected by both factors
and the size oflabor force is not affected.by either.
If, in fact, these two transition probabilities were
the only ones affected by the business cycle, then
the unemployment rate would be a good measure of
labor market conditions, although one could.not
determine whether changes in one or both of the
transition rates were affecting the unemployment
rate. In the next section, it is shown that a large
fraction of the cyclical variation in the unemploy-
ment rate is notexplained by the cyclical variations
in these two within-labor-force rates. In fact,
changes in labor force entry and exit rates affect the
Chart 2
Flows Withinthe Labor Force (UE)
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14unemployment rate significantly and make its inter-
pretation less straightforward.
Labor Force Entry and Exit
The net effects oflabor force entry and exit over
the business cycle detennine how the labor force
participation rate varies.InChart 3, the de-trended,
seasonally adjusted laborforce participation rate for
the 1968-1984 period is plotted. The labor force
participation rate generally rises during expansions
and declines. during recessions although the magni-
tude of the cyclical variation is very small-less
than 1percentage point. 17
This procyclical variation in the labor force par-
ticipation rate has been taken as evidence in support
ofthe discouraged-worker hypothesis and evidence
that the discouraged-worker effect must dominate
the added-worker effect if there is one. However,
one implication of the discouraged-worker hypo-
thesis is that the probability an unemployed person
gives up searching for a job and drops out of the
labor force rises during recessions, when labor
marketconditionsare deteriorating. This is because
the costsofsearch have increasedandthe searcher's
expected wage has declined relative to the impliCit
non~market wage. Below, direct evidence that is
inconsistent with this implication of the discour-
aged~worker hypothesis is presented.
In Chart 4, the probability of becoming a dis-
couraged Searcher~thatis, the monthlyprobability
that an unemployed person drops out of the labor
force (un)~isplotted overtime. Duringeachofthe
four recessions since 1968, the probability ofbeing
a discouraged searcher has declined dramatically;
during each of the expansions, it has generally
increased. For example, during the last recession,
the probability declined by almost 25 percent.This
procyclical behaviorofthe probability ofbecoming
a discouraged searcher is just the opposite ofwhat
the discouraged-worker hypothesis predicts.
One reason that the probability of becoming a
discouragedsearchermay decline during recessions
Chart 3













15is that the composition ofthe unemployed changes.
During a recession, relatively more. workers Who
are permanently attached to the labor force are laid
off. These workers are very unlikely to give up their
search and drop out of the labor force because of
their attachment to the labor force, becausemagy
are eligible for unemployment compensation,
receipt of which is conditional on job search, and
because many are only temporarily laid off.This
change in composition could explain the decline in
the probability ofbecoming a discouraged searcher
during a recession even if any given person were
more likely to become discouraged.
To test the hypothesis that compositionalchanges
in the stock ofthe unemployed explain the cyclical
variation in the probability of becoming.a discour-
aged searcher, the probability of becoming a dis-
couraged searcher is regressed on capacity utiliza-
tion (to measure cyclical effects), time andtime
squared (to allow for time trends) and lagged flows
from employment and not-in-the-Iabor-force· to
unemployment relative to laggedunemployment(to
measure compositional effects).
The results are:










where: EULAG ~ EU -i / 2: U-i / 4
i= I i= I
4 4
NULAG = ~ NU_ i / 2: U-i / 4
i=1 i= I
Chart4
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16The.results show that larger previous flows from
employment to unemployment relative to.the pre-
vious level ofunemployment (EULAG) cause the
ptobability of becoming a discouraged searcher to
fall as expected, Increased previous.flows. from
out-of-the-Iabor-force. (NULAG) lead to higher
probabilities of becoming a discouraged searcher.
This may be because such persons are. less per-
manently attached tothe laborforce than previously
employedpersons.
Furthennore, the regression indicates.thatthere is
still a strong procyclical behavior in the probability
of becoming a discouraged searcher (because the
coefficient ofCU is positive and significant) even
controlling for compositional changes in the stock
of the unemployed. In fact, the coefficient of CU
falls only slightly from .0068 to .0062. when the
lagged flow variables are introduced. This suggests
that some underlying behavioral factor must ac-
count for the cyclical pattern and not just composi-
tional changes.
If the increasing costs of search discouragejob
seekers during recessions, persons not in thelabor
force. should beless likely toenterthelaborforce to
search for employment (that is, to become.unem-
ployed), The cyclical variation inthis ptobability is
depicted in Chart :;. This chart. shows. that the
probabilityofentering the labor force to.search for
employment, in fact, rose ineachofthe four reces-
sions since 1967 and. generally .declined during
expansions.....-,.just the opposite of whatthe<search-
costinterpretationofthe discouraged-worker hypo-
thesis would predict. In fact, this cyclical behavior
suggests. that the added"worker .. effect.dominates
decisions to enter the labor force to search for
employment. 18
Thus, the numberofunemployedisgreaterduring
recessions because of increased entry into unem-
ployment by persons not in the laborforce and
reduced.laborforce exitfromunemployment than it
otherwise would be ifthese two sorts oflabor force
entry andexitrates were constant. Furthermore., the
cyclical behaviorofthese two labor force entry and
exit probabilities is inconsistent with the search-
ChartS
Probability of Entering the Labor Force to Search for Employment (NU)
(Probability of Moving from Not-in-the-Labor-Forceto Unemployment)
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17cost interpretation ofthe discouraged-workerhypo-
thesis and provides support for the added-worker
hypothesis.
It is unclear what the predictions ofthe discour-
aged-worker hypothesis are regarding how flows
from between not-in-the"labor-force and employ-
ment (ne) should vary over the busihesscycle
because changes in a person's search costs would
not directly affect this transition. However,Ol1e
would expect flows from otJt-of-the-labor-fotce to
employment (ne) to parallel flows from unemploy-
ment (ue) to employment because economic factors
that increase the probability that unemployed
workers will find acceptable employrnent should
also increase the likelihood that persons not ill the
labor force will accept employment.
In Chart6, the probabilityofbecomingernployed
if not in the labor force (ne) follows a strong pro-
cyclical pattern-falling during recessions and
rising during expansions-confirming the notion
that flows from out-of-the-Iabor-force toernploy-
ment parallel flows from unemployment to em-
ployment. (In fact, detrended ne andue have a
correlationcoefficientof.36.)Onthe onehand, this
pattern simply may be due to an increase in the
probability of a market wage offer·(which was
generated without search) exceeding the>value of
time in the home as economic conditions improVe.
On the other hand, this pattern would beconsistent
with highersearchcostsanddiscouragementifrnost
of the transitions directly to employment were
really comprised of transitions to unemployment
(nu) followed almost immediately by transitions to
employment (ue). An nu transition followed by aue
transition would be recorded as an ne transition if
the length oftime spent unemployedweretoo short
to be recorded by the monthly CPS. 19
The cyclical variation in labor force entry into
unemployment (nu) and employment (ne) have
largely offsetting effects on the size of the labor
Chart 6
Probability of Entering the Labor Force and Becoming Employed (NE)
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18force, although the net entry is somewhat higher
during recessions. 20 Thus, the behavior of the net
laborforce entry (ne -+- nu)doesnot supportthe idea
thatthe discouraged-workereffectdominates entry
decisions. However, both the increase in entry into
unemployment (nu) during recessions and. the
decrease inentry into employment (ne) increase the
measured unemployment rate.
Labor force exit from employment (en) also var-
ie5iwith the business cycle. InChart7, the probabil-
ityoflabor force exit from employment is plotted.
In. general,.it moves countercyclically~rising
during recessions and falling during expansions.
This is the sort of pattern expected since during
recessions the compensation from employment
declines relative to the implicit returns from non-
market pursuits. Thus, the probability ofleavingthe
labor force from employment (en) should follow
fairly closely the probability of becoming. unem-
ployed if employed (eu). In fact, detrended en and
euhave acorrelationcoefficientof.48. Thecyclical
patternofthis floW, likethatofne, is alsoconsistent
with (butdoes not imply) a discouraged-worker
effect.This is because. some persons whq losetheir
jobs maydrop outofthe laborforce ratherthanseek
employmentbecauseqf high search costs associ-
ated withthe recession,
As discussed earlier, the labor force. exit proba-
bility from unemployment (un)hasjusttheopposite
cyclical pattern-itfalls during recessions and rises
during expansions. Thus, the net effects of labor
force exit from unemployment and employment,
like the net effects ofne and nu on laborforce entry,
are largely offsetting, although net exitis somewhat
higher during recessions. 21 Although the neteffects
ofthese two types oflabor force exit are small, the
increase in.exit from employment (en) and. the
decrease in exit from unemployment (un) during
recessions bqth cause the measured unemployment
rate to rise.
Chart?
Probabilityof Labor Force ExitFrom Employment (EN)













(Seasonally Adjusted 3-month Moving Averages)
19Even though both laborforce entry and exitmove
countercyclically, labor force participation has··a
slight procyclical variation because the counter-
cyclical variation in exit is slightly larger thanthe
countercyclical variation in entry. However, very
small changes in their relative magnitudes could
easily lead to acountercyclical variation in the labor
force participation rate.
A summary ofhow these four laborforce exitand
entry probabilities vary over the business cycle is
presented in Table I. The cyclical variation ineach
ofthese four probabilities leads to greatermeasured
unemployment during recessions and lower unem-
ployment during expansions than would otherwise
occur if these probabilities did not vary·over the
business cycle.
In Chart 8, the variation in the actual unemploy-
ment rate over several recent business cycles is
compared to how it would vary if laborforce exit
andentry rates were held constant at theirmid-cycle
levels22 (the simulated rate) but with flows within
the labor force (eu and ue)· taking their actual
values. This chart shows that a substantiatpl'opor-
tionofthe cyclical variation in the actUa.l unemploy-
ment rate is due to variation in labor force exit and
entry probabilities. Furthennore,the very high
unemployment rates that occurred in the 1973-74
and 1980-82 recessions were partly due tocyclical
changes in exit and entry probabilities, notchanges
in the probability of becoming unemployed if em-
ployed (eu) or the probability of becoming em-
ployed ifunemployed (ue). These results show that
eventhough the neteffectofthe cyclical variation in
these four exit and entry probabilities leads to a
slightprocyclical variation in the laborforce partici-
pation rate, the cyclical variation·in labor force
entry and exit rates leads to highermeasured unem-
ployment rates during recessions.
Chart8
Simulated Versus Calculated Unemployment Rate
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IV. Summary and Conclusions
One interpretation of the discouraged-worker
hypothesis is that searchcosts rise during recessions
and cause an increase in the probability that an
unemployed person will drop out ofthe labor force
(un) and a decrease in the probability that a person
not in the labor force will enter the labor force to
search for unemployment (nu). The evidence pre-
sented in this paper is inconsistent with this inter-
pretation ofthe discouraged-worker hypothesis. The
likelihood of becoming a discouraged searcher-
giving up job search and leaving the labor force-
actually declines during recessions. This is just the
opposite of what the conventional interpretation of
the discouraged-worker hyopthesis predicts. More-
over, the probability ofentering the labor force to
search for employment (that is, to become em-
ployed if previously not in the labor force) rises
during recessions. This result is consistent with
the added-worker, not the discouraged-worker
hypothesis.
Laborforce exit from employment(en) does vary
countercyclically-being higher during recessions
-and this might be consistent with the discour-
aged-worker hypothesis. During recessions some
laid-off workers may drop out of the labor force
rather than search for new employment because
21
search costs are higherduring recessions. However,
increased labor force exit from employment during
recessions also may reflect falling market wages
relative to implicit values oftime in the non-market
sector, and this would not have any implications
about discouraged workers. Similarly, the procyc-
lical pattern oflabor force entry directly to employ-
ment (ne) might also be consistent with the discour-
aged-worker hypothesis because the ne transition
may be comprised ofa nu transition followed by a
ue transition, both ofwhich might not be captured in
the CPS data ifthe duration ofunemployment were
sufficiently short. However, a decline in market
versus non-market wages also would explain the
decline in direct labor force entry into employment
during recessions.
Although there might be some eclectic interpre-
tation ofthe discouragedcworker hypothesis that is
consistent with the observed cyclical pattern ofall
four laborforce exit and entry probabilities, the
explanation of discouragement in terms ofhigher
search costs during recessions is not. The conven-
tional interpretation of the procyclical pattern of
labor force participation as being due to increased
rates of labor force withdrawal by unemployed
workers (un) and reduced rates ofentry to searchforunemployment (nu), is not consistent with the evi-
dence presented in this paper.
The cyclical variation in labor force entry and
exit rates cause the measured unemployment rate to
vary much more over the business cycle-being
higher during recessions and lower during expan-
sions-than it would be ifthese entry and exit rates
were constant and if the within-labor force transi-
tion rates took on their actual values. Moreover, the
procyclical variation in labor force entry into (nu)
and the countercyclical variation exit from unem-
ployment (un) both cause the unemployment rate to
be much higher during recessions than would be the
case ifthey were constant. Because the variation in
these two rates does not directly affect the employ-
ment rate, the unemployment rate has amuch larger
cyclical variation than the employment rate. This
suggests that using only the unemployment rate to
gauge labor market conditions may be misleading
and that the employment rate may be a better indi-
catoroflabor market conditions.
Finally, the results ofthis papercast doubton the
validity of the techniques commonly used to
measure "hidden" unemployment, or the number
of discouraged workers. Although the labor force
participation rate does vary procyclically, this alone
does not imply that unemployment during reces-
sions is necessarily lowerthan itotherwisewouldbe
or that this variation can be used to measure the
number ofdiscouraged workers. The results in this
paper suggest that during recessions some persons
who report themselves to be out of the labor force
would be employed iflabor marketconditions were
better, and that there are also persons who report
themselves as unemployed who would not be in the
laborforce iflabor market conditions were better.
FOOTNOTES
1. For examples of recent articles see Clark and Summers
(1979), Denton (1973), Marston (1976), Smith (1977), Toikka
(1976), Kuch and Sharir (1978), Lundberg (1981), Lilien
(1982), Wachter (1974), and Lucas and Rapping (1969).
The very early work on this subjectis Long (1958), Hansen
(1961) and Woytinsky (1940). Some of the key papers
reviewed by Mincer were Tella (1964), Strand and Dernberg
(1964). Also see Dernberg and Strand (1966) and Barth
(1968).
2. It should be noted that neither unemployment nor em-
ployment "rates" as commonlydefined are rates offlow in a
mathematical sense. Rathertheyare ratios of two stocks. A
rate is a measure of a flow perunit time.
3. Lucas and Rapping (1969) attempt to test this hypothesis
directly by including current actual wages as well as expec-
ted permanent wages as explanatory variables in a model
of labor supply. Also, see Wachter (1974).
4. In a life-cyclelabor-supplymodel estimatedusing micro-
household data, Heckman and McCurdy (1980) find no
labor-supply response to transitory income variations
among married women.
5. The employment rate is the fraction of the population
employed. The labor-force participation rate is the number
of persons employed plus the numberunemployed divided
by the population. Equivalent regressions of employment
on unemployment are also used in some studies.
6. Lundberg (1981) finds strong empiriCal support for this
hypothesis using micro-household data from the Seattle
and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments.
7. Since the labor force is the sum of the employed and
unemployed, such a procedureleadstoan upwardlybiased
estimate if there are measurementerrors in employment. A
positive measurement error increases both the left- and
right-hand side variables and a negative measurement error
22
decreases both variables. This leads to a positive coefficient
ofthe employment-rate variable even if thetrueeffectwere
zero. More importantly, some of these studies omit trend
variables, and unless trend variables are included in the
regression, this procedure does not distinguish the effects
of cyclical variations in employment rates from permanent
changes. For example, during the last 20 years there has
been a sharp increase in both female labor-force participa-
tion rates and employmentrates.
8. See, for example, Flaim (1973), Gastwirth (1973),
Dernberg and Strand (1966), and especially Mincer (1973)
for a review ofthis literature.
9. Marston (1976) was one of the first to show the useful-
ness of stock-flow data in explaining demographic differ-
ences in unemployment rates. Heshowed that much ofthe
observed demographic differences in unemployment rates
is not due to differences in the rate of finding employrnent
once unemployed, but is due to differences. in the rate of
entering unemployment. Smith (1977, 1978), Toikka (1976),
and Toikka et al. (1977) have also used these data in
time-series models.
10. These data were originally published by the Depart-
ment of Labor from May 1948 through December 1952.
Publication ceased then because estimates of unemploy-
ment and employment from the restricted sample required
to compute the flows (personswho complete twoconsecu-
tive surveys) were somewhat different than estimates from
the full sample. However, because of requests.trbm
researchers, publication of the gross-flow data resumed in
1982.
For a description of these data see Smith (1978), andthe
U.S. Department of Labor (1980, 1982). One reason for
differences between gross-flow estimates and the fOIl-
sample estimates is what is called "rotation group bias".
Rotation group biasoccurswhen surveyresponsesdepend5.4E-9*** TIME2
(.51E-9)
.23*** + .0037*** CU
(.035) (.00036)
- 8.1 E-5*** TIME +
(.67E-5)
ue
15. In addition, the unemployment insurance system, by
not beirg fUlly experience rated,providesanincentive for
employers to respond to cyclical changes in demand
through temporary layoffs as opposed.to wage reductions
(see Topel (1983), Feldstein (1973». Lilien (1982) presents
evidence that a substantial fraction of cyclical unemploy-
ment is due to shifts ofemployment demandamong differ-
ent sectors of the.economy. This also suggests that during
recessions eu should rise because of layoffs by employers
experiencing declines in demand and ue should fall be-
causeofthe time needed for laid-offworkers torelocate.
16. As anothertestofthe response offlows within the labor
force to changes aggregate demand, eu and ueare regres-
sed on time (in days), time squared, and capacity utilization
(CU). The results are:
eu = .033*** - .00035*** CU
(.0019) (.000019)
+2.6E-6*** TIME +1.4E-10*** TIME2
(.37E-6) (.31E-10)
***significant at the 1% level.
These regressions confirm that an increase in capacity
utilization leads to a statistically significant increase in the
probability that unemployed persons will find employment
and a statistically significant decrease in the probabilitythat
an employed person will become unemployed.
17. Similarly, a regression run over the '68-'84 period
shows that the labor-force participation rate is positively
related to capacity utilization:
LFPR = .54*** + .00044*** CU
(.0059) (.000060)
+ 5.14 Ec6*** TIME + 3.8*** E-10 TIME2
(.11 E-6) (.96E-10)
However, this regression indicates that a 10 percentage
point increase in the capacity utilization rate increases the
labor-force participation rate by only .4 percentage points.
During this analysis period, the maximum range ofcapacity
utilizationwas 20percentage points, thus indicatingthatthe
maximum rnagnitude of the cyclical effect is very small.
(These results imply an .8 percentage-point variation from
minimum to maximum due to cyclical effects whereas dur-
ing this period the labor-force participation rate actually
increased 5 percentage points.)
18. In addition, the probabilityoflabor-forceentrytosearch
foremploYment{nul was regressed on capacity utilization,
time, and tirne squared to test this hypothesis more for-
mally. The reSUlts were:




Thus, this regression confirms a strong, statistically signifi-
cantcountercyclical movementoftheprobabilityofentering
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Thus, the steady-state effects have the same signs as the
short-run effects.
14. Only about20 percent of the unemployed who were
employed immediatelyprecedingtheirunemploymentspell
quittheirjobs, presumably to look for betterones.
du
dnu
on whether one has been recently surveyed. For a discus-
sion of this problem see Bailar (1975). The CPS sample is
comprised of eight "rotation" groups. Ahousehold is inter-
viewed for four consecutive months, is Off foreight months
and then is interviewed forfour more consecutive months.
Groups 1and 5 (those not surveyed recently)report higher
unemployment, perhaps because of a learning process
associated with being repeatedly served. If so, the sub-
sample used to compute the flows (groups 2-4 and 6-8)
provides more accurate estimates. However, a priori it is
unclear whether the full sample or the matched sample
provide estimates with less bias.
11. That is the flows are estimated from a sample of identi-
cal persons who complete the two consecutive months.
Thus, any persons in the sample the first monthwhodo not
complete the second month's survey and vice versa are
excluded.
12. It can be shown that the steady-state unemployment
rate is given by:
u = a
a+b
where: a eu + (1 - ~len
ne+nu
ne
and b ue + (ne+nu) un










thus proving the long-run effects have the same sign as the
short-run effects. It can be shown that the effects on the
steady-state·employment rate are of opposite sign as
expected.
13. The effects of changes in these rates on the steady-




2319. The CPS defines persons as unemployed if they are
not employed during the survey week, were available for
work, and (a) had made specific efforts to find employment
sometime during the priorfourweeks, or(b) were waiting to
be recalled to a job from which they had been layed off, or
(c) were waiting to report to a newjob within 30days. ThUS,
some fraction ofall unemploymentspells that are lessthan
3 weeks in duration will not be recorded by the monthly
CPS.
20. Although labor-force entry directly into employment is
procyclical, the probability of entering the labor force and
experiencing a spell of unemployment is countercyclical.
The net effect ofthese two types ofentry are largely offset-
ting. To determine whetherthere is any cyclical behaviorof
labor-force entry, the probability of labor-force entry was
regressed on capacity utilization, time and time squared
with the following results:




This regression indicates labor-force entry follows a coun-
tercyclical pattern-entry rates are actually somewhat
higher during recessions. Thus, the increased entry into
unemployment is slightly larger than the decreased entry
into employmentduring recessions.
21. To testthis hypothesis formally, the probabilityoflabor-
force exit was regressed on capacity utilization time and
time squared with the following results:
PRLEXT .067 - .00015***CU
(.0033) (.000033)
-7.8 E-7 TIME - 6.2 E-11 TIME2
(6.2 E-7) (5.3 E-11)
This regression indicates that labor force exit follows a
countercyclical pattern. Thus, the increased exit from em-
ployment during recessions must be somewhat largerthan
the decreased exit from unemployment.
22. That is, for each cycle's midpoint, entry and exit rates
are fixed. The simulated unemployment rate is then calcu-
lated starting with the actual employment-status distribu-
tion at each cycle's midpoint using actual flows within the
laborforce but holding constant entry and exit rates at their
midcycle levels. The actual unemployment rate is calcu-
lated using the initial employment status distribution and
letting all six transition probabilities take on their actual
values.
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